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What Interactions? Notes From Namibia 
Reginald Herbold Green
Achieving higher economic growth for today's population 
at the cost of an unproductive natural habitat for 
future generations is not acceptable. No time should 
be lost in putting in place, country by country, 
environmental action plans and in mobilising broadly 
based popular support for their effective 
implementation. Extensive community-based programs to 
plant trees are also urgently required.
- World Bank, Long-Term 
Perspective Study
Pula! Pula! Pula!
(Water! Wealth! Well Buying!)
- Botswana Invocation
I. ADJUSTMENT/ECOLOGY INTERACTIONS: SOME QUERIES
Structural adjustment seen as an approach to prioritisation, coherence 
testing, resource mobilisation and allocation, stabilisation and growth 
within a context of market force managed production bolstered by state 
provision of basic services, infrastructure and an enabling climate for 
individual, community and enterprise initiatives is important. Whether 
under World Bank rubrics or not, it is increasingly central to actual 
economic policy and praxis in a majority of Sub-Saharan African Polities 
and to most applied economic/political economic analysis of or on SSA.
Ecological protection/regeneration is also important. Looking only at 
economic consequences, present levels of ecological damage will create 
serious new macroeconomic constraints and barriers to adequate household 
livelihoods within a generation. I many cases it is need (national for 
exports to ensure overall economic survival as well as household to provide 
food and fuel to keep members alive) which drives degradation. That poses 
a dilemma - how to enable less poverty and less ecological damage to
coexist now, to avoid irretrievable future human environmental (poverty in 
particular), ecological and macroeconomic costs.
The nature of these two areas of study, strategy, policy and (at least in 
intent) praxis is means they do and will interact whether positively or 
negatively. Structural Adjustment (and/or Transformation) is about 
prioritisation in the allocation of scarce resources. Ecological 
protection and regeneration requires increased resource allocations 
(including policy maker attention and scarce generalist and specialist 
professionals' time) to be effective.
If ecology is viewed as a separate and late add on to the main goals of 
national Structural Adjustment/Transformation programmes, it will be 
underfunded and underintegrated into main lines of action. This has been 
demonstrated in the relative failure of Social Dimensions of Adjustment as 
a parallel, ameliorative project kit approach and its shift (in Bank as 
well as national thinking and - to a degree - action) to placing production 
by poor people, provision of basic services and (tentatively) selective 
safety nets as major poverty reduction priorities to be incorporated within 
main sectoral and macroeconomic priorities and programmes.
From SA To Ecological Programming?
But that case does not necessarily demonstrate that general SA analysis and 
programming is a promising entry point to building up, articulating and 
acting on the ecological front. In the abstract SA is heavily 
macroeconomic at resource allocation level and highly generalised micro 
economic at the more detailed analysis one. To deduce ecological strategy 
from either is likely to prove more than a little difficult; certainly more 
so than drawing broad first directions for exchange rate, crop pricing or 
even human investment policies and approaches.
Ecology tends to be very context specific. Without a firm grounding in 
particular realities and constraints any generalisations are highly 
dangerous and any facile application of deductive logic likely to lead to 
conclusions wrong in direction as well as degree. The lack of ecological 
perspectives in past social science (and World Bank) work and of reasonably 
generally agreed data and approaches to ecological analysis and policy 
formulation increase these difficulties.
3Further, there is a real institutional problem. SA both nationally and in 
relation to external resource providers/policy influencers turns first on 
macroeconomic overviews and frameworks and second on somewhat analogous 
sectoral studies. Its bias is to the reduction of priority lists and 
programme coverage to do what is chosen better. Both the institutions 
involved and the present low priority and resource allocations to ecology 
bias this process against giving priority to ecological strategy (except, 
perhaps, in some cases in the Forestry sector). For example, the Bank's 
Long-Term Perspective Study which does take ecology seriously, actually 
devotes only 1% of its space to it and only 1 (very scrappy) main 
statistical table of 37 (not incidentally Number 37).
An Alternative Approach
Therefore a case can be made for an alternative route to interaction. This 
would be country based for analytical and strategic purposes although 
necessarily built up from zonal and local sub-contexts nationally and cross 
country coordinated when appropriate (e.g. Okavango water management at 
some levels requires coordinated strategic planning and action by Angola - 
Namibia - Botswana).
Its starting point would be ecological themes, issues, trends as they 
related to/were perceived by households, civil society and governmental 
units as decision takers, e.g. water with sub-categories of use allocation 
and levels, preservation of supplies, augmentation of flows, erosion, 
pollution. This accepts the premises that for most human and human 
institutional actors ecology is a set of resources whose importance lies 
largely (by no means wholly in respect to persons, households and civil 
society units with strong cultural or religious beliefs in respect to some 
or all aspects of nature) in its contribution to their present and future 
well-being and that most decisions affecting ecology will not be free 
standing but integrally involved in multi-faceted decisions/actions (e.g. 
which fields to crop, graze, fallow using what techniques) taken for 
reasons which are not merely not solely but not even primarily ecological. 
Certainly some actions - e.g. establishing tree nurseries, distributing 
seedlings/setting up plantations - may be eco centred but their real 
impacts (including the narrowly ecological) will depend largely on how they 
relate to a set of other decisions and the goals underlying them (e.g. 
farming and household income management systems).
4Broad ecological protection/management/regeneration perspectives and some 
rules of thumb for what to do (and not to do) in the presence of imperfect 
data to inform decisions which will in fact be taken (adequate data or not) 
can be articulated moderately quickly and in potentially operational form 
by this approach. The problems of articulation (specific cases, specific 
data, specific techniques, specific monitoring) are fairly standard in the 
sense that they are not radically different in kind from those relating to, 
e.g. crop production or primary health access development. Those of 
interaction may be - or may seem to be because they are inadequately 
perceived and acted on in respect to other themes. The dominant one is 
physical/natural ecology and human environment. The human environment of 
most of Sub-Saharan Africa (urban as well as rural) is one of poverty and 
of urgent, immediate need. If ecological themes and actions do and can be 
seen to address these environmental realities positively they can get on 
agendas from personal/household to cabinet/presidential; otherwise they 
have little chance.
The parallel large actor/enterprise environment interaction is less hard to 
define and - in principle - to manage. Enterprises respond to demonstrated 
possibilities to increase gains (e.g. air pollution control which produces 
payable by-products or increases worker morale and productivity) or to 
reduce or avoid costs (e.g. taxes on normal and fines on 'abnormal' 
emissions and the risk of enforced shut-down if some known ceiling is 
broken). There is experience in elaborating, applying and evaluating 
combinations of these and literature on relevant economic and 
organisational analytical issues broadly relevant to ecological 
programming.
Ecology is highly decentralised in two senses. Its themes/programmatic 
areas crosscut sectoral lines, e.g. purity and preservation of flows of 
water relates to Agriculture and Livestock, Industry, Mining, Urban 
Affairs. Further, ecology is in direct contact with and directly affected 
by the actions of most or all households as well as by those of key 
enterprise, governmental and civil society decision-takers. From this flow 
several operational/institutional implications:
1. a strong data collection, analytical, strategic formulation, policy and 
programme design unit to shape perceptions, catalyse - coordinate - 
monitor - action is likely to be both feasible and necessary but an
5operational line ministry is not (least of all in personnel and funding 
poor countries);
2. community support and operational involvement is necessary if many 
aspects of protection (e.g. wildlife), management (e.g. water) and 
regeneration (e.g tree-shrub-bush cover) are to be implemented beyond 
large actor enclaves;
3. neither main line ministries nor communities (and their member 
households) can afford to give priority to ecological protection, 
management and regeneration unless they are convinced that not doing so 
will have high medium term costs and that doing so is possible using 
technically (including time required) and economically feasible means 
and will yield palpable benefits (e.g larger crops, tourist related 
payments, more water to allocate);
4. therefore, a network from community/household action through line 
operating bodies to central decision-taking units (with a sub-chain in 
the other direction to large operating units such as mines, irrigation 
schemes, fishing fleet operators) serviced and catalysed by the
t
ecological unit is potentially feasible whereas a normal sectoral top 
down, single dominant actor one is not.
The third main section of this paper undertakes initial explorations toward 
such an approach in respect to rural Namibia with particular reference to 
agriculture.
II. THE ECOLOGY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
General Propositions
Ecological policy based on Structural Adjustment as entry point begins with 
three basic propositions, First, increased price (reward) for a product 
will result in increased production of that product. Second, increased 
resource allocation to producing something (e.g. agricultural research) 
will result in higher output. Third, increased efficiency in resource use 
will lead to increased output, especially of the products on whose 
production the efficiency increases are centred.
6These are valid and powerful propositions which do contribute to 
interpreting present and project future actions/outcomes and, thereby, to 
identifying means to influence them and the impact of particular policy 
instruments. They are not - nor do their more serious practitioners assert 
that they are - a complete identification/explanation of behaviour, albeit 
their potential for incorporating non-pecuniary goals, e.g. power, 
security, sustainability is greater than many critics seem to realise.
However, their applicability in any particular case rests on the 
applicability of certain assumptions. First - external (to the actor) 
costs and benefits are low (e.g. the prudent irrigation water user gets 
most of the gains and the imprudent bears most of the costs of his/her 
actions). Second - non-pecuniary resource constraints (e.g. knowledge) are 
relatively few and relaxable. Third - resources for investment now to 
achieve future gains can be mobilised (e.g. a hill farmer can - if output 
prices justify - borrow resources to terrace to sustain/increase yields). 
Fourth - changes in output level/technique carry low perceived and actual 
catastrophic risk level (e.g. introduction of a hybrid seed trebling output 
in normal rainfall years but quartering in drought ones will not take place 
at the onset of a drought cycle). Fifth - individual and social valuation 
of future, as weighed against present, gains are roughly the same (e.g. the 
peasant household which must grow a crop to eat this year values future 
gains from erosion protection similarly to society as the trustee of future 
generations and is able to act on that valuation).
Unfortunately in few areas are the assumptions as open not only to
particular exceptions but also to doubts as to general applicability as in
doing ecology.
And Their Articulation
From these general propositions it is perfectly possible to articulate to 
the ecological (or other) probable impact of particular SA policy 
instruments. And from that stage it is practicable to work out the 
ecological significance of a specific Structural Adjustment Programme 
instrument by instrument and - less clearly given aggregation and 
interaction problems - overall.
This has been done in the case of Malawi. The various contributions have
been synthesized and then summarised in tabular form by Mearns. The
7initial impression is of an analytical framework of very considerable 
articulation, explanatory and projective power capable of providing a large 
number of insights and opportunities for action.
That impression is by no means wrong. Such a systematic exploration can 
identify dangerous policies, new opportunities, the support (or otherwise) 
instruments adopted for non-ecological reasons can give to ecological 
strategy articulation and praxis. Doubts arise when it is suggested that 
it is also a convenient entry point for constructing national ecological 
strategies and programmes.
SAPS As Ecopolicy Systems: Some Limitations
The SA entry point - especially when working primarily from general process 
assumptions to the impact of particular policy/programme instrument 
packages in a country - has certain inherent limitations. To canvass them 
is not to argue that SAPS are irrelevant or contradictory to sound national 
ecostrategies but to explore what relationships are likely to be productive 
and sustainable.
r
First, the SA based analysis indicates directions rather than quantifiable 
estimates of how much, how fast, how adequate to the needs/goals specific 
to the sector concerned.
Second, considerable uncertainty as to results arises in some cases, e.g. 
increased hydro power use has positive "greenhouse" effects, may decrease 
pressure on trees for fuel, by drowning productive land can increase 
pressure leading to degradation of fragile soils and/or deforestation of 
remaining woodlands. Price changes will alter crop mixes and production 
techniques. If the shifts reduce tree relative to field crops and surface 
cover intercropping relative to spaced row single stands, the direct 
ecological results are likely to be negative whatever the indirect ones of 
more income available for all uses including sustainability protection.
Third, in general the ecological results of SAP instruments can be expected 
to be incremental and slow. Higher coffee prices do indeed increase 
resources for - inter alia - protecting soils and altering techniques but 
can hardly be expected to have dramatic impact in those directions in the 
short term.
8Fourth, the ecological impact of SAP instruments is a side effect not the 
major reason for their adoption (with some exceptions in the case of 
forestry)- This implies that their adequacy in terms of ecological 
strategy and practice is rather unlikely. Certainly one could devise a SAP 
whose main goals were ecological - unlikely as either the Bank or any SSA 
government is to do so. But that might be a rather odd way to do ecology 
and would certainly be an odd way to do Structural Adjustment. The 
demonstrable power of SAPS lies in augmenting capacity for production - 
mobilisation - allocation and efficiency enhancing of resource flows to 
achieve growth and balance not in detailed substantive analysis of 
substantive, sector or theme specific issues and processes. Because growth 
and balance (sustainability in a quite different sense) are crucial to 
African economies, polities, societies and households restructuring SAPS' 
central concerns sway form those goals would appear risky and imprudent.
Fifth, for the general incentives flowing from SAP instruments to be 
effective specific other resources and contexts (enabling environments) not 
contained in nor deducible from the instruments themselves are likely to be 
necessary. Knowledge, physical inputs and finance (and/or direct labour 
time) are all necessary for - e.g. - building up sustainable agro-forestry. 
These require both concrete state action and an enabling environment for 
community and household action. The problems are particularly acute - as 
the Bank's LTPS very cogently stresses - for poor peasant households 
producing largely for self-provisioning. In such cases quick, visible 
output gains and initial techniques requiring primarily off-season labour 
time plus specific physical inputs with no cash cost (e.g. boulders 
collected to lay on contour lines, seedlings provided free from nursery 
plantations) appear to be a virtual sine qua non for initiating 
ecologically, environmentally and ecologically positive processes of 
change.
Sixth - the interaction of multiple instruments with different impacts is 
difficult to aggregate and depends substantially on the speed and sequence 
of instrument application. For example, ending fertiliser subsidies by 
itself is likely to reduce their use (especially by poorer farmers on 
poorer soils) with negative consequences. Introducing competition and/or 
marketing cost/profit margin compression increases grower incomes and is 
likely to result in enhanced fertiliser purchases. If the second is
9sequenced to lead the first the net effect may be positive ecologically; 
but, if the first is the lead instrument, the reverse is likely.
Seventh - and perhaps most crucial - the cases in which the deductions from 
the general propositions through specific instruments to actions will be 
wrong (i.e. the direction of change will be the opposite of that expected) 
are not trivial. Some are counterintuitive (e.g economic logic is both not 
dominant and not complementary to the dominant logic on which the relevant 
decisions are made). Most are not genuinely counterintuitive (in that 
sense) but result from specific contexts in which the economic logic of the 
actors posits actions other than those generally predictable.
This is not a limitation unique to ecological considerations. The 
"backward bending supply curve" problem (higher real price leading to fall 
in output) is a classic example. Cases range from certain West African 
groxindnut producers through New York plumbers in the late 1970s to Kuwaiti 
oil production in much of the 1970s. Examination of each case allows 
identification of reasons (other uses of groundnuts _ e.g. household 
consumption, high value of leisure time and - at the time - low level of 
other unmet priority uses of potential income, prudent management of finite 
oil stock at time of limited physical investment opportunities and negative 
real interest rates on financial assets) why the actions were (at least in 
intent and arguably in practice) economically rational.
In SSA a number of such cases relating to ecology are to be found. The 
mechanised, rainfed sorghum sub-sector in the Sudan and the larger scale 
'improving' (actually landmining) farmers of an Iringa sub-district in 
Tanzania both responded to higher real prices by raising output through 
ecologically unsustainable and devastating shifts of technology. Both had 
short time horizons and believed they could manipulate state (Sudan) and 
community (Tanzania) processes to acquire more land at low cost after 
wearing out and discarding their initial allotments. Similarly in both 
Ghana and Tanzania there are cases in which new roads have made forest 
village access to transport real and urban expansion has raised 
woodfuel/charcoal prices. Together these gave trees previously valuable 
(and sustainable) for household fuel, building materials, food and fodder a 
cash value for the first time. Specialisation in tree cropping resulted 
but - in the absence of known 'forest' management techniques at village 
level - at the price of rapid environmental degradation, possibly offset
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for the villagers (but not more generally) by shifting the cleared land to 
truck garden production for the same urban markets that had eaten the 
trees. None of these results flies in the face of economic logic but not 
one is 'predictable' without prior contextual knowledge.
This analysis of limitations strongly suggests that ecostrategies should 
not be derived from SAPS but should begin at ground (or air or water) level 
with ecological and human environmental (including economic) 
considerations; be integrated into more usual sectoral policy and practice 
(governmental and non-governmental) and then fed into the SAP process.
That will assuredly force trade-offs - future ecological protection at the 
price of present human destruction is neither acceptable nor practicable - 
but not one way ones - SAP instruments increasing output at high ecological 
cost would need to be altered or offset.
Still less should it be read as a case for the World Bank to "get out of 
the ecology business". The Bank's Environmental Department is not solely - 
or even primarily - concerned with SAPS. (Indeed field experience with SAP 
construction in SSA suggests its involvement is extremely peripheral.) Its 
strength in respect to assessing the ecological and environmental 
consequences (positive or negative) of particular projects and programmes 
and in identifying ways to manage and to enhance or offset them would 
appear to be both greater and more readily enhanceable than its direct 
contribution (as opposed to environmental vetting and monitoring) of SA and 
SAPS per se.
III. TOWARD A RURAL NAMIBIAN ECO-ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 
The Unforgiving Land
Environment, at least as a social science or a political process, is about 
human beings as well as about ecology in the narrower sense. To modify 
Adam Smith on the incompatibility of sustained national wealth and human 
misery - no ecological zone can be healthy and sustainable the majority of 
whose residents survive in misery and extreme need.
Neither the ecological nor the human condition present context nor 
inherited dynamic in rural Namibia is an easy or a happy one. Both are 
unforgiving of error and past errors have been major and long persisted in.
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The ecology is basically that of semi-arid to desert lands - fragile, easy 
to damage, hard to restore. The human condition is - for most rural 
Namibians - one of severe to absolute poverty in an institutional context 
and economic structure which (even post-apartheid and with independence) 
offers no easy ways out.
These two realities - of ecological erosion and of human misery - interact. 
In the North more people on the same land area have pushed beyond the 
margins of ecological sustainability of soil and of vegetation. Need, not 
greed, is the destructive dynamic so far as the rural households are 
concerned, although the ultimate cause is past European rancher greed for 
land which hemmed in the northern rural households. In the Centre and 
South, many ranches built on underpaid labour still do not earn plausible 
returns on resources used and often have pushed the ecology to or beyond 
the tipping point into secular degradation. In the 1890s many ranches near 
Windhoek had seasonal open water and no erosion gulleys, nor the compacted, 
impermeable surface soil that causes them. To argue about whether worker
need or rancher greed/need is key is to miss basic reality: no ranching
system which cannot provide decent living conditions (including income, 
housing, nutrition and access to basic services) to its working households, 
a positive return on capital used and production patterns ecologically 
friendly enough to halt/avert secular degradation can be sustainable.
Not all choices are of that type. There are trade-offs. Namibia is water 
short - or at least most of it is inherently short of physically and 
economically accessible water. The total reasonable urban household, 
mining, industrial, rural household, livestock and crop demand is beyond 
economically viable and ecologically sustainable flow levels. Hard choices 
have to be made by use and by location. To seek to avoid them by drawing
down stocks (as appears to be happening now in the Kaarstveldt and other
artesian areas) is to delay facing unforgiving future ecological limits 
and, by so doing, to make the achievement of humanly acceptable and 
ecologically sustainable accommodations harder.
Proposals for deep ploughing, levelling with heavy equipment and setting up 
standard irrigation channel systems have been made in respect of the Oshana 
country. Given the specific, complex structure of the natural ridges and 
channels this would be much more likely to reduce than to enhance soil 
fertility. Worse, the deep ploughing and use of heavy equipment would
12
carry a high risk (near certainty?) of cracking the relatively shallow 
hard-pan underlying surface sand and soil, thus releasing the deep salt 
water reservoir beneath it and creating a new and larger analogue to the 
Etosha Pan. The danger of acting on ill-considered and virtually 
ecological damage untested proposals in the context of an unforgiving 
environment and of the need for extreme caution in handling risks of 
irreversible damage could hardly be better illustrated.
Wildlife and mixed farming are competitors for (alternative users of) land, 
vegetation, water. Certainly both uses can, and should, co-exist in 
Namibia as a whole. Indeed, some areas suitable for wildlife (e.g. 
Sossuvlei, Skeleton Coast National Park, Fish River Canyon, Etosha Pan) are 
pretty nearly totally unsuitable for any other use. But at the margins 
there are trade-offs and choices and the worst course is to pretend they do 
not exist and thus to make them accidentally, fragmentarily and ultimately 
more by inaction than by conscious decision.
For example, there is a sound wildlife ecology case for a corridor 
connecting the Skeleton Coast wildlife zone to the Etosha Pan one. Part of 
this corridor would require curtailing rather limited, low grade present 
grazing areas. Further, it would limit potential expansion south of 
grazing - or mixed farming - areas through boreholes to serve areas with 
vegetation and some rainfall but no surface water. This is not an easy 
decision because the Oshana country is disastrously (in terms of ecological 
damage and of human poverty) overloaded and extending it south on the west
side (as well as on the less contentious east) is attractive and
potentially ecologically sustainable. But for both Namibian and global 
wildlife heritage reasons (including potential employment and revenue gains 
to Namibians), restoring and enhancing the Northern wildlife belt from the 
Skeleton Coast through Etosha is a serious proposal deserving serious 
attention. It is also one which, if adopted, should be used as a basis for
mobilising external support. Let the richer portion of humankind
contribute to protecting its "common heritage" in Namibia directly and by 
financing alternative livelihood enhancing programmes for Kaokoveldt and 
Oshana country rural households.
Pula, Pula, Pula! - First Steps and Steps To Avoid
It is undesirable - as well as usually unnecessary - to specialise in the 
role of Cassandra. To purvey a prospect of unrelieved doom and gloom is to
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increase the probability of being doomed to that future by distracting 
attention from, and demobilising efforts toward, ways of averting disaster. 
Whether ones readers accept and despair or reject and ignore, an ecological 
message of doom is not likely to protect the ecology.
Namibia's ecology is damaged. It is not irrevocably destroyed. There are 
limits to ecological carrying and self-regenerating capacity, but they can 
be increased and are not yet - in most cases - hopelessly surpassed.
Judging from conversations, the press and the Independence Day Parade 
floats, ecological concern in Namibia is real and fairly widespread; an 
enabling climate necessary, even if not sufficient, for ecological 
protection and regeneration. That is a climate which does not exist to the 
same degree in many other countries.
Similarly the unacceptability of the human condition of a majority of 
Namibians is not simply perceived, but is a priority in respect to 
governmental and - perhaps less uniformly - civil society action. The 
returning war migrants and the dislocated persons of town exurbs and the 
Oshakati-Ondangwa-Ongwediva triangle are visible literally and as public 
concerns. So are the conditions under which many ranch workers exist and - 
perhaps less widely - the deadly interaction of human need and ecological 
degradation in much of the North.
What is needed now is the development of a coherent, articulated, informed 
strategy in relation to sustainable environment which includes both the 
ecological and human condition strands. Because that will necessarily take 
time, a set of preliminary guide-lines and caveats may be useful:
1. be cautious in the absence of clear evidence of ecological safety - 
delaying a safe gain is less damaging then incurring an irreversible 
loss (e.g. block new water pumping from reservoirs which are clearly or 
probably already being drawn down faster than the recharge rate);
2. where practicable halt ecological degradation now; at the least take 
action to slow it and set target dates for halting and beginning to 
reverse it (e.g. initiation of suitable seedling distribution and 
household tree and bush planting programmes);
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3 give argent attention to ecologically friendly means of increasing the
livelihood sustaining capacity of both the small and the large scale
farming/ranching sectors (e.g. holistic grazing systems);
4 view trees-bushes-shrubs in the context of silviculture and
farming/ranching systems (including their livelihood effects) not only 
from forestry, fuel supply and ecological preservation perspectives;
5. build up a national (and local) water flow/stock and potential
augmentation inventory (inventories) and another of present uses as 
rapidly as possible to allow 20 year perspective programmes for water 
development, allocation, charging and use and in the interim seek, at 
the least, to halt expansion of unsustainable national (local) uses;
6. in parallel to the above proceed with water use/supply/protection 
agreements with Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and - when possible 
- South Africa in respect of border rivers and trans-border 
drainage/basin systems;
7. review available experience on large, medium and small scale irrigation 
with a view to determining sustainability (with special reference to 
soil salination) and viability and defer any borderline large and 
medium scale expansion until clear evidence and analysis is to hand 
while experimenting in respect to small scale and, probably, small or 
medium Orange River margin pump or weir schemes;
8. evaluate shifts in production pattern and price policies (e.g. to 
encourage mixed farming, oilseeds, urban market "truck gardening", 
silviculture) in ecological and livelihood as well as physical supply 
and food price/food security terms;
9. collect data on experience and research in other SADCC countries with a
view to adaptation and field testing crops - techniques - services - 
institutions for Namibian use (in respect to agriculture-livestock- 
silviculture generally but including ecology and food security);
10. recognise that, except for beef and karakul, rural production is not 
and will not be central to the macroeconomic dynamics of Namibia so 
that ecological viability and livelihood enhancing (not narrower 
physical or financial surplus) targets should be the central ones.
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A Matter of Time
Ecology is a crucial matter and a serious one. Because it has, at least 
until the past decade, been systematically ignored - in capitalist and 
centrally planned socialist economies alike - its advocates have 
necessarily become crusaders and engaged in a certain amount of rhetorical 
overkill and factual over-simplification. This was - and to some degree 
still is - necessary to get and to keep ecology squarely on the agenda.
But it now has a cost. Real policy influence - once an issue is accepted - 
requires seriousness, accuracy and attention to economic (and especially 
livelihood) consequences. The Independence Day float slogan "Save the Gay 
Whales" (logically impossible?) attracts attention; it can hardly help 
inform policy.
Ecology will not be saved unless doing so can be shown to be economically 
beneficial. Wildlife and wilderness will live or die on demonstrating that 
protecting them is at least as valuable as alternative land uses. 
Furthermore, who receives the gains matters. Wildlife protection that 
limits the agricultural activities of neighbouring rural residents is 
practicable - without massive repression up to and including shooting 
intruders on sight - only if they share in the benefits in a way
perceptible to them. If that condition is met experience in Tanzania and
Zimbabwe suggests local communities become very wildlife protection 
oriented.
Similarly, emotion is not an adequate guide to policy. Never culling seals 
is not an ecologically sound policy - nor very plausible for a country, one 
of whose major economic sectors is fishing. But culling without careful 
studies can become killing off whole local seal populations. And public 
relations matters: explaining why culling is licensed and on what criteria; 
insisting that the whole carcase (or at least the skin and part of the
meat) be used, requiring humane killing (shooting not clubbing).
Karakul is an example of inept public relations. Karakul is not an 
endangered nor a wild species (albeit it would be both if the fur market 
collapsed). Far fewer people object to products of domesticated animals 
than of wild (let alone of endangered) species. Why has Namibia failed to 
position karakul to take advantage of that fact? Similarly why has the new 
positioning not included new styles to replace the dowdy 'grandmother's 
coat' image it now - however unfairly - has. Karakul issues matter for
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ecology and for environment. Most uses of many southern Namibian areas 
would do ecological damage if at levels seeking to produce parallel output 
and employment levels to those now provided by karakul. The collapse of 
the karakul industry would endanger the livelihoods of up to 10,000 
households; its recovery could greatly improve them. "Karakul: the Modern 
New Style 'Green' Fur" is an attainable, desirable and environmentally/ 
ecologically protective image for which to aim.
On the basis sketched above it is potentially possible to transit from 
"unforgiving land" to "Pula, Pula, Pula". If the first pula is read 
narrowly as rain, admittedly not much can be done; but if read as water 
then supply, conservation, and use are subject to major gains (or losses) 
from better and different management. Similarly wealth in the sense of 
riches is, in general, not attainable for most rural households; but wealth 
in the broader sense of decent livelihoods and human conditions for those 
who live on the land is attainable. So, too, is their well-being 
consistent with the well-being (sustainability) of Namibia's rural ecology.
Ecology - Elements, Threats and Building Blocks
It is relatively easy to draw up a check-list of threats and elements but 
remarkably difficult to articulate in a policy and programme focused way:
1) data is scarce, scattered, full of gaps;
2) Namibia is not homogeneous. To write specifically on land quality - 
use - carrying capacity - present situation, trends and future 
prospects/portents without specifying whether one is talking about the 
Kaokoveldt, the Oshana Country, the Okavango Valley, the Eastern 
Caprivi (itself arguably in three zones), the Otavi Highlands, Gibeon 
or the Orange River potentially irrigable zone makes no sense;
3) the ecological aspects cannot be abstracted from the human if one is 
concerned with future pressures and possibilities - creating an 
ecological paradise at the expense of rural residents is neither 
practicable administratively nor politically, while sustaining rural 
livelihoods by ecological destruction is at best a short run expedient 
clearly humanly and fiscally (as well as ecologically) disastrous in 
the medium term.
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The key ecological factors are land, water, vegetation, air, sea and 
wildlife/"wilderness". The threats to them include overuse and pollution 
leading to, e.g. erosion, salination, fertility decline, quality 
degradation (in plant populations), desertification, poisoning (e.g. via 
polluted - including saline - water and airborne chemicals/radiation/dust), 
destruction of stocks (of fish or wildlife).1
Of these the sea - i.e. slaughter catching of fish, shellfish and marine 
mammal stock problem - poses an important and specific problem. However, 
the ecology of Namibia makes it virtually totally separate from other rural 
ecology and livelihood issues. Air pollution's flashpoints in Namibia are 
Rossing and Tsumeb. Rossing can be seen as an environmental and 
occupational health time bomb which has been ticking away for over a 
decade. The air pollution downwind is still visible despite significant 
improvements, at the level of dust and - presumably - also remains in its 
less visible, but more deadly, parallel of radiation. Water pollution is 
also a known problem, which may or may not be better contained now than in 
the past. The history of the relatively comparable USA Rocky Mountain/dry 
Southwestern Plateau uranium oxide mining/processing operations suggests 
present protective and pollution reduction measures - for workers, for 
downwind/downwater communities in the Arandis-Walvis Bay-Swakopmund 
triangle and for the ecology - are still inadequate. Because uranium oxide 
has a relatively high value - say $25 a pound - better protection - which 
might cost $.10 to $.15 per pound a year after capital costs of $0.50 per 
pound - probably is consistent with continued profitable operation, even in 
the present parlous state of the world yellowcake market. But unless a 
local government - trade union - medical - ecological pressure group is 
formed, inertia, private partner interests and fear of tampering with 
Namibia's second most important single economic asset are likely to slow or 
block positive change.
The Tsumeb ecological pollution focus is the smelter. (There are other 
environmental health problems in the mines, but largely focused on mine 
personnel not the general public nor rural ecology.) The smelter plume 
contains a variety of noxious substances of which the chief is sulphur.
The dryness (usually) of the atmosphere limits the degree to which this
1 A more detailed review of and policy proposals for these sectors is
available from the author at the Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK.
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descends as sulphuric acid but random depositing of over 1,000 tonnes a 
year of sulphur particles is, in any form, ecologically unsatisfactory and
humanly unacceptable even if sulphur is in some contexts a useful
fertiliser component. Technologies for sulphur (and other pollutant) 
extraction exist and are widely used. Their 'only' problem is cost - about 
$.08 a pound gross operating and capital cost, less $.01 to $.03 value of 
sulphur recovered for a net cost of $.05 to $.07 per pound and $0.30 a 
pound initial investment judging from Southwestern USA experience. With 
present base metal prices recovered to well over $1.50 a pound and Tsumeb's 
return to profitability, these costs are probably just consistent with 
continued profitable operation but would very sharply reduce profits (half 
USA Southwestern smelters and associated mines closed in the 1980s - a 
period of lower real prices than now - because they could not meet the
costs of "clean air" laws and remain viable). As with Rossing the
ecological problem - while presumptively affecting crops and herds in the 
Tsumeb case - is not primarily rural nor agricultural.
Wildlife/wilderness issues do affect agriculture but in somewhat special 
ways because the basic issue is normally what land should be dedicated to 
which. In most cases the two uses are not mutually compatible on the same 
piece of land. It is at the margin that trade-offs arise. These are 
unlikely to be for small areas: in few parts of Namibia is the use of up to 
5,000 ha to protect a scenic attraction likely to have a high agricultural 
opportunity cost and rarely is such a small area viable by itself for 
wildlife. The Skeleton Coast/Etosha corridor illustrates the nature of the 
real and difficult choices likely to arise and is probably the most
guantitatively significant and temporally urgent of them.
But wildlife and wilderness areas do need to be protected and serviced - 
not merely zoned - if they are to survive. To the extent costs can be 
covered from visitor fees without the visitors themselves wrecking what 
they come to preserve, no inherent problem arises (Etosha is probably an 
example, as are non- or quasi-wildnerness). To the extent it is argued 
that Namibian wildlife and wilderness are part of a global and national
heritage which has claims on resources in its own right, there are problems
of priority to that heritage and/versus priority to survival and 
development needs of poor Namibians - unless external grant funds for 
wildlife/wilderness programmes are substantial.
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Game ranching is best considered as ranching not wildlife. The ecological 
case is that many pastures have better carrying capacity for game (who also 
are less damaging to vegetation than cattle, sheep or a fortiori goats). 
While possible to overstate, this case is broadly accurate of many semi- 
desert grazing areas. The convincing logical case that such game ranching 
is/should be economically more viable remains, unfortunately, problematic 
in practice. There are viable game ranches - including in Namibia. But 
they are few in number, usually capital and skill intensive. To pose pure 
game ranch versus pure cattle (or sheep) ranches may not be an appropriate 
approach. Arguably a mix of three elements: a) cattle or small stock; b) 
cropped wildlife and/or c) wildlife tourism (guesthouses and game viewing) 
is attainable. One clear problem with wildlife cropping is broadening 
industrial market access via negotiating sanitary/hygiene agreements and 
contracting adequate marketing agents in Europe and North America. For 
ranch wildlife tourism, there is a factual or a perception problem. If 
such tourism strengthens ranch economies and preserves/raises employment 
(especially female employment) a strong ecological-environmental-economic 
case for it. But if it reduces employment and total ranch sales, even if 
increasing profitability, a real conflict between private profit and 
national product/employment exists.
Human Enjoyment and Ecology
Production, distribution, power, population and poverty relations interact 
with ecology. This is particularly true of Namibia today and for at least 
two decades to come, because non-rural sectors cannot supply livelihoods 
for the whole population so that "going to town" is not a solution to rural 
poverty (and would create concentrated environmental horror zones in and 
around cities and main towns broadly analogous to the present Oshakati- 
Ongwediva-Ondangwa exurban triangle). Improving rural livelihood/access to 
services and housing conditions to avert tidal waves of in-comers to urban 
areas is a necessary strategic priority. Reconciling it with ecological 
damage reduction and reversal is not going to be easy. Pretending there is 
no such priority will have even more negative environmental consequences.
Rural inequality characterised by cramming large numbers of households or 
fragments of households into small areas of often marginal land with next 
to no attention to raising household sector productivity is a recipe for 
growing environmental degradation (human and ecological) as population in
these areas rises. That is the underlying historic dynamic of much of what 
South Africa described as "homelands" or "second tier authority" areas. So 
long as alternative livelihoods and household security systems do not exist 
for most of these people (and their descendants), the problem remains and 
worsens now even after the ending of apartheid/'homelands'. The long run 
solutions doubtless lie in creation of alternative livelihoods and 
household security systems but the short and medium need to include changes 
to increase productivity and increase ecological friendliness.
These areas are characterised by need driven ecological degradation. Need 
for fuel for fodder, for crops to eat, for livestock to eat and to sell -
need, all rising with population - forces overcollection of bush,
overcutting of trees, overgrazing, cultivating too continuously with too 
little return of nutrient to the soil. In analysing and acting on this
type of downward spiral two dead end roads need to be avoided: 1.) seeking
to enforce ecological sustainability by fiat and force - unlikely to 
succeed and certain further to immiserize poor people; 2.) saying that the 
ecological damage is not the poor people's fault but the systems's (true 
enough) and that therefore nothing can or needs to be done (false, 
especially as the burden of the ecological damage will fall primarily on 
the next generations of poor people).
The large ranching/mixed farming sector initially typified the economy of 
greed - stolen land, cheap (de facto forced) labour, limited ecological 
awareness), proprietor levels of consumption vastly higher than those of 
workers which were near to or below the absolute poverty line, master- 
servant type labour relations. Reconciliation should mean not shaking 
fists (or more lethal weapons) over the past, but it must not mean 
declining to analyse it and its heritage and failing to act to transcend 
them.
Worker livelihoods need to be raised and households reunited - for human 
and political reasons and also to retain a labour force. Subsidies (which 
have been unsustainably high counting capital grants, concessional interest 
rates, residence payments, special services, etc.) need to be reduced; 
overstocking and under-investment in pasture maintenance and improvement 
needs to be halted. The issue is - how? There are no longer (and 
historically have usually not been) large profit margins to meet these 
osts. Ranch proprietors, in general, do not have incomes above the
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professional-managerial-medium sized entrepreneurial average and often have 
sizeable debt burdens and low cash balances. Clearly either income (ranch 
cash and worker self-provisioning) must be enhanced or costs cut or both.
Routes which would reduce employment and raise capital intensity and scale 
are open to question economically and would make a serious negative 
contribution to the adequate livelihood creation priority. Turning the 
land back to 'traditional' ranching would lower costs, but also output, 
with very doubtful gains to worker livelihood. Work team based approaches 
(or conversion to Batswana model large and medium scale ranches) could be 
viable if adequate knowledge, experience and skills were available. They 
are not available today - at least for broad front conversion. The status 
quo is not viable except in the very short run.
But some means toward an answer have to be found and action on their 
implementation begun within 2 to 3 years. Ostrich and game ranches may 
chip at the edges. So may encouraging artisanal production by worker' 
household members, but the basic answer has to lie somewhere in the 
livestock - worker provisioning crop - cash crop matrix.
t
Superimposed on these two long term problems is that of the war displaced 
persons. The most visible - especially from a capital/major city 
perspective - may be those returning from abroad. However, the majority of 
displacees - especially the majority of desperately poor people among them 
- are internally displaced people from the districts loosely describable as 
the Ovambo and Kavango rural areas. These at their 1989 peak numbered up 
to 300,000 whereas rural oriented external returnees probably are well 
under 50,000. The end of the war and therefore of sales of goods and 
services to the RSA occupation forces (and now to UNTAG) has sharply 
reduced urban and peri urban formal and informal employment. Many of these 
people need to be able to return to their homes. But they cannot return 
without systematic enabling support - tools for agriculture and for house 
building, seeds, implements, household utensils, food until the harvest, 
core livestock to rebuild that aspect of mixed farming. And unless there 
are systematic family sector household friendly programmes for reversing 
tree/bush destruction and soil depletion, their return cannot be made 
compatible with ecological stabilisation and sustainability.
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"Pula, Pula, Pula I" ?
This study cannot constitute a complete ecological and human environmental 
programme for rural Namibia. Its aim is much more modest:
1. to demonstrate the negative and systematic interactions of ecological 
degradation and human poverty in Namibia;
2. to identify the most serious environmental/ecological risks and 
downward dynamics in rural Namibia today with special reference to 
agriculture;
3. to suggest how one can ask questions about these risks/downward 
dynamics which direct attention toward humanly and ecologically 
sustainable answers - and to ask some of those questions;
4. to suggest some initial, partial answers which - if implemented - could 
improve environmental/ecological dynamics and buy time for articulating 
fuller strategies based on additional data and analysis.
Clearly that is not enough to announce the attainment of "water, wealth, 
wellbeing!", but it should be a first step in that direction. Ecological 
sustainability - especially in a context of pervasive rural poverty and a 
fragile natural environment - is only attainable at the end of a long 
journey. To begin that journey requires taking first steps now (precisely 
because the journey is long and the time available to complete it not so 
long) and taking them in the right direction (because wrong steps may be 
virtually irreversible).
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Annex: TOWARD MORE ARTICULATED PROGRAMMING
Water: Supply Expansion, Conservation, Allocation
Water is Namibia's scarcest natural resource. It is also the one in which 
agricultural/non-agricultural trade-off issues are of immediate urgency and 
have major consequences.
There are two safe and sustainable sources of additional water - border 
rivers and the mid-Caprivi swamp. The basic problems are:
a. economic viability
b. allocation - given that the total additional supplies are far from 
unlimited.
To the extent that allocations are to mining and to urban uses the water 
will - on site - be high cost because the concentrations of users are far 
from the borders. About that little can be done, albeit it is a case for 
shifting urbanisation (more particularly urban production and employment) 
to the North and, to the small extent likely to be practicable, the extreme 
South. But for agricultural uses the nearer the user areas to the borders 
the better. This cannot be a sole criterion - soil suitability is also 
relevant, but on the face of it capital costs and transit losses should 
create a presumption in favour of water using agricultural development in 
the North and extreme South not in the central zone.
Water management agreements are urgently needed with Angola and with 
Botswana for the Kunene, Okavango and related systems/basins. These need 
to include watershed management (including forest protection, dams, etc.), 
flow level targets, national offtake minimum guarantees/maximum allowances. 
Because at present much of the potential is not used, there is a real 
possibility for amicable agreement if data collection and analysis is begun 
now and negotiations in - say - 1991.
Similar agreement in respect to the waters around the Eastern Caprivi Strip 
- with Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe - is equally desirable but 
less urgent because it is unlikely that developments in any state over the 
next few years could prejudice the rights of other users and because the 
viability of substantial irrigation in Eastern Caprivi is still far less 
than clear-cut.
Orange River water right negotiations are likely to prove difficult. South 
Africa has a severe water shortage. Therefore, any South African 
government (not least a post-apartheid one) will be concerned to limit 
Namibian offtake. That offtake is now very small because the former 
occupying power blocked almost all recent applications for pump or other 
schemes on the North Bank while developing an irrigation zone at Uppington 
in the Northwest Cape.
The immediate priorities would appear to be:
a. securing preliminary assessment of technical and economic feasibility 
of pump scheme, weir and/or larger irrigation schemes drawing water 
from the Orange and of plausible requirements;
2b. estimating total Orange River flow (pre diversions in Lesotho from the 
Orange to the Rand) and determining what per cent Namibia as one of the 
three Riparian states can plausibly demand - say 10% or 5%? (On the 
basis of share of the three states' population it would be about 5% but 
Namibia - especially Southern Namibia - arguably has less alternative 
sources than South Africa.)
c. publicly and formally asserting Namibia's rights as an Orange River 
Riparian state. (This means rejection of RSA's claim to a North Bank 
boundary. That claim rests on the fact that German colonial land 
claims were precisely that - they did not state water boundaries. In 
practice in the Cameroon and Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria cases the 
Germans and British colonial authorities used the "thalweg" or middle 
channel of the river or lake as the water boundary.)
d. issuing some Orange River water abstraction licenses soon and beginning 
operation of at least a few new pump schemes plus, perhaps, expansion 
of the Oranjemund one. (South Africa is unlikely to choose to make a 
casus belli of such action.)
e. request both Lesotho and South Africa to negotiate a permanent - or at 
least an interim agreement. (And secure expert negotiating advice. 
Swaziland's experience may be instructive in certain positive and 
negative aspects, albeit in that case South Africa accepted from the 
start that Swaziland had some downstream rights and there was already 
substantial historic offtake.)
While draining the Middle Caprivi swamp (and perhaps irrigating into East 
Caprivi with the offtake?) would appear to be sustainable and not evidently 
ecological vandalism (unless a special case for that particular swamp's 
ecological uniqueness and importance can be made out), no action appears 
urgent. It is totally unclear what optimum uses for the land would be; 
whether and when draining/irrigating would be viable; what the (clearly 
high) initial capital cost would be and how it could be mobilised. At most 
beginning an ecological and a pre-feasibility drainage and land/water use 
study in 1992 would appear appropriate.
Whether damming or otherwise collecting runoff water is a safe additional 
source is a contextual and empirical question. To the extent it would 
otherwise flow - e.g. - directly into areas of the Namib and Kalahari with 
no vegetation or animal population probably yes. But if it either provides 
seasonal water to vegetation/animals or recharges underground water tables 
there is a clear trade-off. The fall in the Windhoek area water table and 
disappearance of surface water relates at least in part to reservoir and 
artesian well water collection for the metropolis. Since physical water 
storage and movement costs (notably evaporation) are high, it is not self- 
evident that there is a case for systematic damming of every seasonal 
watercourse though there is for some.
The most vexed problem relates to borehole, well and pumped spring water.
In these cases pumping can for a time exceed recharging but at the price of 
lowering the water table. Determining when the sustainable offtake level 
has been passed is not easy - except in gross overdrawing cases - because 
of national, regional and local drought cycles. The logical policy is one 
of prudence:
a. if it is likely but not absolutely certain that offtake secularly
exceeds recharging then no new or expanded offtake should be allowed
3(except for local human consumption) until a definitive 
flow/stock/offtake/recharge analysis is completed. This appears to 
apply to most of the Kaarstveldt and some lesser artesian areas today. 
It is better to underuse for a few years than to face a future problem 
of cutting use below recharge to restore water tables. And any 
additional investment made prior to discovering the need to freeze or 
cut offtake will be wasted;
b. where offtake clearly is grossly above recharge now, move at once to 
phase down offtake - phased parallel to bringing in "outside" water 
where this is economically feasible;
c. if present offtake clearly is sustainable, but the maximum sustainable 
level is in doubt, allow limited additional offtake while giving 
priority to a definitive study of sustainable offtake. This may be 
relevant to certain areas south of the Oshana country and of the 
Okavango Valley and to the east/southwest of the Etosha pan. In those 
cases preference should be given to family sector household use 
(including livestock).
Desalination is - barring major technological breakthroughs - not relevant 
to water for agricultural (or scattered rural village/homestead) use for 
cost reasons. It may be relevant for selected towns, industries or tourist 
sites on the coast.
Irrigation is not a substitute for water. That may seem obvious, but there 
have been irrigation programmes which built up reservoir and user capacity 
far above poor rainfall flow levels and thus made irrigated agriculture 
almost as rain dependent as rainfed, especially if below average rainfall 
periods exceeded on year. Examples exist in Zimbabwe.
Irrigation: Limits and Options
Large scale irrigation in Namibia is unlikely to be viable except from 
border rivers or the Middle Caprivi Swamp. (The Oshana Country could be 
described as large scale natural irrigation which might be augmented by 
diversion of Kunene water into the system, but this is in effect a border 
river case.) Even then viability is in doubt despite recent sugar estate 
proposals. Before risking its own resources (including guarantees and 
subsidies) Namibia should secure far more viability (and even feasibility) 
analysis.
Medium scale irrigation from pump schemes drawing on border rivers (and the 
Okavango) clearly can be viable albeit where, for what crops, under what 
techniques, requires further study. For the family sector there may be a 
case for co-op or public sector pumping units and main channels selling 
water to household units. Whether medium scale irrigation on the 
Hardap/Mariental model is economically viable, or - given salination 
problems - even sustainable ecologically, requires further study of 
existing projects before new ones are initiated.
Boreholes are unlikely in most areas (the Kaarstveldt including Otavi 
Highlands/Tsumeb and some other artesian zones may be exceptions) to be an 
economically viable source for irrigation of substantial areas. The 
exceptions are likely to be in cases in which rain and natural surface 
water provide most of crop needs and only relatively short seasonal or
4drought Year topping up from pumped or artesian underground sources is 
needed.
Spot irrigation in basically ranching units (e.g. "kitchen gardens", fruit, 
vegetables, limited grain) for household self-provisioning may be more 
generally viable than its present limited provision would suggest. In this 
case the water for crops is a joint product or by-product with that for 
human and livestock use and - subject to offtake limits - may have a low 
incremental cost. There is an urgency in ascertaining what the empirical 
realities in different districts are because such additional food output is 
one possible route to raising total ranch cash sale and worker consumption 
output value. These increases could help bridge the conundrum of 
unacceptably low wages, unacceptably high subsidies and - for most ranches 
- marginal present unit profitability. So could more general promotion of 
craft production by spouses of workers - as practised on a number of 
ranches in the Windhoek area.
Water pricing (and user facility offtake limitation) poses a series of 
difficult questions for Namibia. A - controversial - set of principles (or 
rules of thumb) might include:
a. full cost (including depreciation and interest on capital cost) pricing 
of water to mining, manufacturing and commerce. This is crucial to 
avoid distortions of uses and of location in the context of physically 
scarce, high cost water. If specific mines or industries or towns can 
make a case for subsidies, this should be specific to the unit and
transparent, not general and hidden in the water price/budget;
b. cross subsidisation of urban household water prices via an inverse step'
tariff (i.e. higher charges above some threshold level because car 
washing and urban gardening are consumer amenity goods, unlike basic 
drinking/cooking/cleansing water) with some charges (perhaps on a 
neighbourhood user committee basis) even for stand-pipe water - 
combined with its systematic provision;
c. partial subsidisation of rural household water and of small ranch/mixed 
farm livestock water. Overall the goal should be to recover at least 
recurrent/maintenance costs but this needs to vary from district (or 
sub-district) to district in relation to total water cost and lowness 
of income. Again innovative use of water user committees to collect 
funds and to provide labour/routine maintenance should complement or 
substitute for more usual fee systems;
d. full cost pricing for commercial ranches/farms served by publicly 
financed water supples, including FNDC and other large ranches and 
Mariental/Hardap irrigation plots. When (a) this charge would force 
closure of the unit and (b) there is a clearly defensible social or 
broader national economic case for keeping the unit in being, a flat 
sum subsidy (flat not per unit of water used to encourage water 
conservation) should be paid. For example, Mariental/Hardap could not 
bear full cost pricing; it arguably has experimental/demonstration 
value; it is not clear there are alternative uses for the water. 
Therefore, pending review, lump sum subsidies paid from the Treasury to 
the scheme may well be justified at the same time as full cost water 
rates to be met jointly by the users and the subsidy;
e. strict licensing (including some form of monitorable offtake ceiling) 
on ranch-farm-other enterprise extraction of water from own facilities
5unless there is no present or near term limit to withdrawals from that 
source. A "grandfather clause" approval of recent past offtake levels 
may be necessary as a starting point (subject to later review) but new 
or increased offtake proposals should be strictly monitored especially 
in borehole areas with secularly falling water tables where - in 
general - the applications should be disapproved.
Clearly price is not an adequate sole policy instrument. But for 
commercial enterprises and for urban areas as a whole, it is hard to 
justify subsidising a scarce resource with an incremental capital and 
operating cost above average cost (and even more above present charges). 
Subsidisation should be targeted to poor urban households and to household 
sector rural families in water charges and to enterprises (rural, mining or 
urban) which can make a case via transparent general subsidies (not water 
rate concessions). Furthermore, while enterprises should be encouraged to 
produce their own water (which full cost pricing for public water sales 
will do), their offtake must be controlled because sources are limited and, 
in the absence of control by licensing with enforcement a combination of 
"first drilled, first served", more and more wells producing less and less 
per well and rapidly falling water tables is highly likely.
Vegetation: Trees, Bushes, Pasture
Namibia faces three major and two secondary environmental degradation 
dynamics in respect to vegetation:
1. degradation of pasturage from the interaction of overstocking and 
drought cycles;
2. denudation of shrub, bush, tree cover especially in the densely 
populated northern areas as a result of household fuel and pole 
requirements and - secondarily - levels of stocking and intensity of 
cultivation;
3. rapid reduction of tree and large bush cover to supply urban household 
fuel requirements;
4. commercial and artisanal forestry cutting without replanting;
5. human and livestock presence in/entry onto exceedingly fragile 
ecological environments.
The dominant dynamics driving this pattern of ecological and human 
condition degradation are human population, animal stock levels, drought 
and - in the past decade - war. The ecology/poverty interaction and the 
dominance of need or mixed need/greed factors are evident. Only in the 
case of some of the forestry (including the war looting of trees and 
trophies) and the richer ranches (which on the whole have better pasture 
conservation and safer stocking levels - not worse) can pure greed be put 
forward seriously as being dominant.
To approach the challenge as primarily one of forestry or of trees as 
normally defined is misleading. Pasturage is at least as important as 
trees-bushes-shrubs and these are by no means limited to trees. Fuel, 
artisanal and household building and fodder are the main users (or 
denuders) of trees-bushes-shrubs, not commercial forestry. Pasture for
6stock, fuel and poles for rural households, and fuel for low income urban 
households are important to at least 1 million poor Namibians whereas 
forestry will never be a major sector in economic terms nor in livelihood 
generation.
Pasture degradation flows from overstocking absolutely or relative to 
carrying capacity during drought cycles. (Carrying capacity varies widely 
over the cycle - to sustain stocks appropriate to good rainfall years 
during droughts would be impossible and to hold stock levels down at all 
times to levels sustainable at the trough of a multi year drought would be 
reckless over-caution.) Such degradation is reportedly prevalent in 
marginal large ranching zones, the densely populated northern areas, barren 
southern ex-'homelands' and (perhaps less uniformly) the ex-Omaheke desert 
areas developed for grazing by the post-War of Resistance Herero refugees.
A detailed review and survey (perhaps from analysis of satellite picture 
blowups is needed to pin-point extent and location). In a different sense 
war clearances and abandonments may have resulted in bush and coarser grass 
growth which also damages pasture cover.
The interaction with drought occurs when stock sales (or deaths) early in 
the drought cycle do not keep pace with decline in sustainable carrying 
capacity and restocking after the drought proceeds too fast and with too 
little investment in pasture regeneration to allow recovery. It is 
possible that the poor price/cost position and the security/political 
uncertainties following the last drought cycle have delayed restocking to a 
degree helping natural regeneration. On the other hand they have surely 
also cut investment in regeneration.
In respect to large ranches the programme outline for restoring and 
maintaining pasture is fairly clear:
a. produce (or check existing) data on carrying capacity in normal years 
and requisite cutbacks during droughts;
b. monitor actual herd levels and provide financial penalties for 
sustained, significant overstocking;
c. review data (including Botswana, Zimbabwe data) on methods of pasture 
regeneration and upgrading with full field testing (at government cost) 
on selected ranches;
d. provide partial grants and/or full soft loans for regeneration on 
degrazed or at risk units;
e. carry out an exercise similar to "c" in respect to stock level, 
"paddock" rotation (with and without wire fences - without is more 
labour intensive but may or may not be more costly if fences are not 
subsidised by capital and/or interest grants) including recent 
innovations in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia;
f. broaden the use of the holistic pasture/ranch management (small 
paddock, short period intensive rotational grazing) system which has 
demonstrated potential for improving pasture quality, raising carrying 
capacity and decompacting soil (increasing water absorption and 
reducing erosion during rains);
7g. provide effective extension based on "e" (including any new methods 
found desirable - present ones are presumably extended by existing 
service) and impose financial penalties for serious mismanagement.
Such an approach should halt degradation and begin regeneration within two 
years. It would provide a breathing space for data collection and analysis 
toward a longer term solution.
For 'traditional' ranching and mixed farming areas a somewhat different 
approach is needed:
a. broaden carrying capacity and rotation of pasture studies and extension 
services from the large ranch sub-sector to include all livestock 
growers (the Zimbabwe and Botswana approach);
b. encourage lowering stock levels where excessive, as well as investment 
in pasture improvement and rotation systems by extension and partial 
grants/soft loans, plus providing a last resort/fair price market from 
a public sector entity for culled stock until/unless there is a 
competitive, accessible commercial stock buying network to do so;
c. examine how holistic pasture/ranch management can be adapted for 
application to communal grazing areas (by no means necessarily a 
daydream);
d. explore the possibility of local government (at village or herding 
community level) imposition of sanctions against those keeping too many 
stock and/or practising bad pasture maintenance/rotation techniques. 
Central government penalisation is unlikely to be very effective and is 
certain to be deeply resented judging by experience elsewhere in 
Africa. (A functioning system exists in several Northern States in 
Nigeria - at quasi-traditional local government level).
A necessary complement to the basic small scale/mixed ranching pasture 
regeneration and reduction of stocks in overused areas is extending usable 
grazing areas. This can be done in some cases by selective use of 
boreholes in adjacent areas with some vegetation/rainfall but no surface 
water. However, care must be taken to avoid the disaster created by the 
Club de Sahel in its comparable programme in West Africa which ended by 
raising, not spreading, herds and shifting them during good years to areas 
whose vegetation cover was then overgrazed and collapsed totally in the 
early 1980s drought cycle. New areas should have firm stock ceilings from 
the start.
In certain 'traditional1 ranching areas serious equity problems arise. 
(Examples include the ex-Omaheke and Rehoboth). Very unequal access to 
grazing rights and herd sizes combine with limited sustainable carrying 
capacity to prevent escape from absolute poverty for the lo or nil herd 
majority of households and/or to ensure overstocking and degradation. 
Clearly the issue is potentially explosive but the only environmentally (or 
ecologically) valid answers are absolute ceilings on herd size and/or 
absolute reduction in numbers of households dependent on ranching in these 
areas.
/■■usehold fuel and building pole damage to tree-bush-shrub stocks have 
causes similar to pasture degradation in the small ranching/mixed farming 
sector. This is hardly surprising as the same households facing the same
8poverty pressures are acting on the basis of short term survival necessity 
in both instances.
The degree of present damage varies widely. It is appalling in - e.g. the 
central Oshana country and certain southern rural slums, e.g. Gibeon, used 
by the past regime as human dumping grounds. It is moderate in some less 
arid and less populated areas - e.g. parts of Eastern Caprivi. However, 
with rising population on the land (plus growing urban fuel demand) and 
repetitive drought cycles, the danger of further degradation is national 
not local.
No response based primarily on coercion - forbidding cutting of vegetation 
or forced relocation of families - can be humanly acceptable nor can it be 
politically sustainable nor administratively practicable. Equally, rushing 
about planting (paying people to plant) trees without prior study of local 
contexts and building up community support is unlikely to do much good.
An initial programme (or set of district/zonal programmes) might include:
a. survey of present position (possibly from analysis of blown up earth 
satellite photographs) and - to the extent possible - trends;
b. development of extension programmes (backed by appropriate traditional 
of field tested seeds/seedlings) to encourage household and village 
woodlots, windbreaks, farmstead groves;
c. operating "b" on a modern silvicultural focus taking into account human 
food, fodder, poles (for building), thatch and fuel uses of individual 
and combined trees-bushes-shrubs. (Such multiple uses do characterise 
past Namibian household economies/livelihood especially, but not only, 
in areas near Kunene and Okavango rivers);
d. utilising tree planting (especially for urban fuel supply but also for 
soil conservation, watershed protection, village fuel/building 
materials) as a seasonal, labour intensive supplementary employment 
programme (e.g. up to 2 months per person employed at R 3 to 4 per day 
with 50% or more of person months to be female) to serve both 
ecological regeneration and poor household human environmental 
rehabilitation objectives;
e. encouraging local government/communities to engage in 'community 
forest' and 'pasture shrub-bush-tree population' management and 
protection and to exert social pressure sanctions on reckless 
destruction of vegetation;
f. studying experience on poor household silviculture and community 
forestry in, e.g. India, Ethiopia and Tanzania with a view to 
adaptation and testing in Namibia.
These steps are probably at best a temporary damage halting/partial 
reversal stopgap at least in the central Oshana country. There the 
population/land ratio (taking fertility into account) is probably well 
above long term environmental sustainability. But they should buy time to 
be spent on longer term transformations, including achieving other rural or 
urban livelihoods for some of the families now resident in overcrowded 
Northern (and Central/Southern rural slum) areas.
9Urban fuel requirements cannot in the long term be met fully from 
sustainable wood production. To date they seem to have been met primarily 
by a cancerous destruction of wood stocks in growing circles around cities 
with resultant increases in poor household real fuel costs and longer and 
longer hauls for wood which tend to concentrate gains in buyer-transporter- 
wholesaler oligopolies.
To date there are no cases in SSA of achieving sustainable, or even stable 
real cost, low income urban household fuel supplies. Greater efficiency in 
wood use has limitations as does enhanced rotational (self-sustaining) 
production while alternative fuels either have high initial capital costs 
(e.g. electricity, bottled gas) or fuel bills (e.g. kerosine) or both (e.g. 
coal) and some - especially coal - pose ecological questions and others 
safety ones (e.g. kerosine and, to a lesser extent, bottled gas). An 
initial Namibian programme package could have two clusters - demand 
containment and sustainable supply expansion:
Demand containment (especially Windhoek)
a. encouragement of use of electricity for cooking/lighting by low 
connection charges and low rates for small consumers (cross-subsidised 
by higher unit charges to large consumption households) as well as by 
market access to low cost small 2 or 3 'burner1 hotplate type cookers;
b. analogous promotion of bottled gas;
c. analysis leading - if results are positive - to promotion of sawdust,
coal and mixed heating briquets (and low cost artisanal stoves for 
them) to supplement/substitute for wood;
d. study of whether a low cost (i.e. recovery of initial capital cost in
fuel saving in 6 months or less), improved efficiency, artisanally
producible stove is feasible and if so its promotion (including initial
support to workshops producing it) for a limited period.
Sustainable Supply Enhancement
a. identify suitable (ecologically, economically) trees for rotational 
woodlot/plantation production by district/zone;
b. provide extension advice to potential growers (rural family sector 
households, ranches, co-ops, mining companies) and back this up with 
partial establishment period capital grants and/or soft loans (possibly 
channelled via a seasonal employment programme of the type discussed in 
respect to household/village sector tree stock regeneration);
c. limit public sector 'production' to tree planting for ecological and 
watershed/reservoir protection and - if seen as necessary - a limited 
number of small, 'demonstration' mini-plantations;
d. monitor whether moderate cost, competitive purchasing, transporting, 
wholesaling channels do emerge as a result of market forces and - if 
not - provide technical assistance and soft loans/loan guarantees to 
co-op or small business purchasers-hauliers-urban marketers.
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Commercial forestry - concentrated around Rundu except for a few (and 
presumably 'self-sustaining') pit prop plantations associated with mines - 
is almost certainly cutting at unsustainable levels and failing to exercise
proper forest management techniques. It is, however, a lesser and more
limited area ecological destroyer than the previous three simply because 
Namibia has never had (and barring rather unlikely climatic or water 
availability changes, never will have) large forest areas. To the extent 
it is dominated by medium sized sawmills or full time established artisanal 
pit sawyers, standard control and extension measures should be applicable. 
So far as human environment/poverty issues are relevant they probably turn 
more on the sustained supply of reasonable cost inputs into construction, 
carpentry, furniture production than on livelihoods in forestry itself.
However, as there is a forestry department and a number of para- 
professional foresters trained abroad, an initial programme should be set 
up speedily including:
a. setting logging limits and logging charges;
b. encouraging replanting via multi-year concessions renewable if well
managed/revocable if overlogged and partial rebates of logging charges 
toward agreed replanting programmes (not directly applicable to pit 
sawyers);
c. conducting a detailed forest inventory (again probably starting with 
analysis of satellite photo blowups) and collection of modern forest 
management/regulation techniques (including via the relevant SADCC unit 
in Lilongwe);
r
d. on the basis of "c" revising the initial measures taken at "a", "b"; 
probably instituting seedling production and distribution; possibly 
creating forest reserves with no or highly selective logging allowed.
Rather more detailed and technical discussion of fuel and forestry issues 
is to be found in the relevant chapter of Namibia: Perspectives Towards 
National Reconstruction and Development.
The fragile ecological zone intrusion problem is basically a 
wildlife/wilderness one as the relevant areas - e.g. parts of Fish River 
Canyon and coastal belt - are hardly of much value for livestock let alone 
crop or tree production. The danger presumably comes primarily from 
tourists. The cure probably lies - at least in the short run - in ensuring 
that all such areas are gazetted as national parks and/or reserves with 
access by all persons (except present residents, e.g. San) allowed only by 
permit; that permits are limited in number and carry high enough fees to 
provide for accompanying (necessarily small) parties with a guide. Recent 
past damage has - reportedly - been severe but apparently related to 'spare 
time' activities of the former occupying power's 'security' forces so the 
immediate risk of further damage may not be massive.
The Land - Overuse and Undernourishment
Namibia's land suffers from wind and water erosion. This is - with the 
exception of coastal dune movements - apparently very uneven in area and/or 
scope. Except to the extent it relates to water or pasturage or tree- 
shrub-bush ecological damage it is not readily controllable in the short
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run. For example, no general ecological protection programme could have 
saved the Finger of God - even setting aside the views of those who saw its 
fall as a symbol of the withdrawal of the "Mandate of Heaven" from the 
former regime. Grouting with special concrete and coating with a resin 
skin might have, but at a cost limiting the conceivable frequency and 
extent of application.
The land degradation dynamic interacts closely with those of water and 
vegetation. Therefore in one sense the water and vegetation analysis and 
programme explorations above are as important to land protection as what 
follows.
Land quality reduction - especially in the densely populated areas in the 
North - results from too frequent cropping draining nutrients from the soil 
with limited or no replenishment. Degradation of vegetation exacerbates 
this process by furthering limiting nutrient return as does burning (rather 
than digging in) of crop plants after harvest. Livestock usually take less 
nutrients (via grasses) from the soil and return more via manure - unless 
it is collected and used for fuel as may happen with tree-shrub-bush 
degradation.
This is at present a poverty cycle with growing numbers of people wedged 
onto a fixed (and relatively low natural productivity) land area. Its 
extent will expand if cropping is broadened and intensified, e.g. in 
Caprivi, Okavango Valley and Otavi Highlands albeit in those cases the 
longer term poverty consequences will, initially, be less visible.
The answer does not lie in "traditional African practices". This is not 
because the rural African family sector does not have a working grasp of 
sustainability or a respect for the land. Neither is it because the 
techniques were unsound "before the Europeans came". Rather it is for the 
reason that they turned on relatively long rotations with a low ratio of 
cropped to resting years. That approach requires a low household/land 
ratio which is no longer possible in much of the North.
Economically viable, soil sustaining, intensive cropping (low rest to crop 
year ratios and high crop output per hectare) requires direct return of 
nutrients to the soil. Digging back unused portions of crop, increasing 
tree-bush-shrub population, use of livestock manure can contribute 
something but often not enough. Selective use of chemical fertilisers is 
necessary. (Organic gardening in the north is on balance hi tech, lo yield 
per hectare and hi cost per kilo produced. These are not the ideal 
characteristics for either household self-provisioning or urban food supply 
crop production in Namibia.)
It is difficult to devise programmatic steps at present for two reasons: 
first, black small farm households are largely outside the experience and 
coverage of the extension service and second, even in respect to large, 
white farmers the extension service's priorities and competences have 
focused on livestock. That said, certain elements toward a programme can 
be identified:
1. broadening the extension service to encompass all farmers and adapting 
its techniques to ensure that it is user friendly for small farmers:
2. strengthening the crop oriented component of the service and its back­
up research (including collection and adaptation/testing of research
12
and extension results elsewhere in the Region, e.g. via SACCAR in 
Gaborone);
3. analysing possible (ecologically and economically) crop rotations 
including crops (e.g. some oilseeds, legumes, fodder plants) providing 
natural restoration of soil nutrient levels as well as potential gains 
from better use of manure and crop by-products (e.g dead plants). 
Extending positive results achieved from the analysis and testing;
4. securing relevant data from comparable ecological zones, backed by 
local testing, on response to chemical fertilisers in different 
Namibian ecological zones and channelling results into extension 
advice;
5. providing initial use incentives for selected fertilisers through 
limited period free "starter packs" either as a self-standing project 
or (as in Zimbabwe) in conjunction with introducing/encouraging new 
crops.
A special problem does arise in respect to soil nourishment and to human 
animal disease control. The techniques needed for these purposes are not 
usually ecologically neutral.
Likely levels of fertiliser and pesticide/herbicide application do not seem 
very likely to have serious water pollution risks. However, this may not 
be so valid an assumption if well sources are close to the surface and draw 
from mini-aquifers nor in respect to low flow seasonal streams and to water 
passing through irrigation schemes such as Mariental/Hardap.
r
The danger to users is significantly greater. For fertilizers and some 
pesticides/herbicides clear labelling and extension demonstrations are 
needed and can be adequate. For other pesticides/herbicides either 
controlled use by trained personnel or bans are the realistic options and 
for the most dangerous pure bans. As an initial guide to which is which 
and what to do about it, data should be secured on USA and on Zimbabwean 
experience and regulations.
Animal disease control (particularly in respect to tse tse flies) and human 
disease control (particularly in respect to anopheles mosquitos) are 
occasionally challenged by ecologists on behalf of the flies and mosquitos. 
The present author admits to a bias in favour of young children (the main 
victims of malaria) and small ranchers/mixed farmers (whose livelihoods are 
most at risk from tse tse flies) and therefore rejects these arguments out 
of hand. Similarly, the bush clearing often needed for permanent tse tse 
control is normally not inconsistent with ecologically acceptable ground 
cover and the protection of a thicket for ecological reasons when it is an 
actual livestock and potential human sleeping sickness focus is presumably 
not appealing to any but the most single minded of ecologists.
However, the chemical problems are very real. The ones which are effective 
and affordable range from pretty noxious to potentially catastrophically 
so. The potential victims are the people and livestock to be protected 
plus wildlife so that this problem cannot be brushed aside. The best that 
can be done is to use the lowest possible dose of the least noxious 
effective and affordable chemical under the greatest practicable safeguard. 
In respect to the tse tse fly there is a body of Southern African
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experience albeit the evaluation of the use - under tight control - of 
dieldrin is incandescent from two directions with ecologist objections to 
its use at all and aid agency/livestock scientist/sprayer near explosions 
over how restrictive safeguards have been.
RHG
